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Abstract
The American presidential nomination process consists of a series of elections (primaries) in which
states vote at diﬀerent times. This paper focuses on the problem faced by a political party that wants to
choose the optimal temporal structure for its primaries. I consider an environment in which a sequential
election may generate voter herding, and address both when and how the party can beneﬁt from social
learning to maximize the probability of selecting the highest quality candidate. By choosing whether to
have a sequential election and—if so—the actual sequence in which states vote, the party can control
whether momentum eﬀects will be present and guarantee that any voter herding will be ex ante beneﬁcial
to the goal of selecting the highest quality candidate. When candidates are expected to have equal loyal
support, simultaneous voting outperforms all sequential elections. When one candidate has more loyal
support, a sequential election can outperform simultaneous voting; under this condition, voter herding
compensates for the loyal voter imbalance. This result is a novel example of a beneﬁcial information
cascade, in contrast with the socially ineﬃcient cascades in the standard herding literature. In a sequential
election, it is optimal for the states voting early in the primary season to be those which: (i) are smaller,
(ii) have fewer loyal voters, (iii) have more informed voters, and (iv) display more voter diversity.
JEL classiﬁcation: D71, D72, D82, D83.
∗This paper was a chapter of my dissertation at the University of Pennsylvania. I am indebted to Antonio Merlo for his
guidance and support. I would also like to thank Andrew Postlewaite, Alvaro Sandroni, Philipp Kircher, Mattias Polborn, Eddie
Dekel, Steven Callander, Brian Knight, Rebecca Morton, Matias Iaryczower, Aureo De Paula, Navin Kartik, Alessandra Casella,
Larbi Alaoui, Irina Telyukova, Shalini Roy, Eleanor Harvill, Nirav Mehta, Antonio Penta, Ben Lester and seminar participants
at the University of Pennsylvania for helpful comments. All errors are my own.
†Bo˘ gazi¸ ci University, Department of Economics, Natuk Birkan, Bebek, ˙ Istanbul, Turkey, TR-34342. email:
deniz.selman@boun.edu.tr.
1“Leaders in the Republican and Democratic parties are struggling to contain a national calendar
revolt...that threatens to shift the 2008 presidential nominating contest into the closing months of
2007. And by all indications, they are losing.” - The Washington Post, 5 May 2007
1 Introduction
The American presidential nomination process consists of a series of elections (primaries) held across the
many states and territories over several months. The sequential nature of primaries has produced presidential
nominees that most experts feel would not have won their party’s nomination under simultaneous voting.
Jimmy Carter’s nomination by the Democratic Party in 1976 is a famous example.1 In an empirical study,
Knight & Schiﬀ (2007) estimate that voters in early primary states have up to 20 times more inﬂuence in the
selection of nominees than later voters.2
While the signiﬁcance of primaries’ sequencing is well known and often debated, the existing primary
calendar has developed more through tradition, political maneuvering and sheer accident than by central
party planning. Still, there is recent evidence of both major political parties attempting to control aspects of
their primaries’ temporal structure. When Florida and Michigan decided to move their respective primaries
to January in the 2008 election, both parties threatened to take away some or all of those states’ delegates
to prevent the move. In the same election, the Democratic Party allowed both Nevada and South Carolina
to hold early primaries in order to increase the inﬂuence of minority voters.3 Despite these and other minor
interventions, the following question remains unanswered: If a party could make all decisions regarding primary
dates centrally, what sequence of primaries should it use to select its nominee?
This paper focuses on the problem faced by a political party that wants to choose the optimal temporal
structure for its primaries. To identify the best system for the party, I develop a model of a presidential primary
with two candidates from the same party and incomplete information. Voters are assumed to either be loyal
voters of one of the candidates (meaning they vote for that candidate unconditionally) or uncommitted voters,
who have common preferences so that they all wish to vote for the highest quality candidate. Nature determines
which of the candidates is of highest quality, and all uncommitted voters obtain private signals regarding
candidate quality. Results from state primaries are observed by all voters as they occur. Uncommitted voters
are Bayesian: they vote for the candidate who is best with the highest posterior probability at the time
they must vote.4 The party’s nominee is determined by majority rule over all states. Given this framework,
the political party chooses the temporal structure of the election to maximize the probability of electing the
highest quality candidate. In doing so, the party faces two obstacles: ﬁrst, it is uncertain which candidate
is best; second, it does not know the exact number of loyal voters and uncommitted voters in the party’s
electorate.
The driving force behind the model is the response of uncommitted voters to diﬀerent systems of primaries.
While loyal voter behavior is ﬁxed, uncommitted voters’ behavior depends on the temporal structure of the
1Bartels (1988) dedicates an entire chapter, “The Case of Jimmy Carter”, to describing how Carter gained crucial support
and momentum as a direct result of surprising victories in early primaries.
2Using voters’ reactions to daily opinion polls in several states in the 2004 Democratic primaries, Knight & Schiﬀ (2007)
ﬁnd that early primary results inﬂuence later voters’ opinions. In particular, late voters adjust their opinions relative to their
expectations before the early primaries. Such a reaction by late voters corresponds to theoretical results in both Ali & Kartik
(2007) and this paper.
3The Rules Committee of the Democratic National Committee speciﬁcally picked Nevada to respond to complaints that
western states and minority voters (14% of Nevada’s voters are Hispanic) were underrepresented in early primaries, making it
the ﬁrst ever state whose primary date was directly determined by a national party.
4Ali & Kartik (2007) refer to this voting behavior as posterior-based voting.
2primaries. In a simultaneous election, uncommitted voters have only their own private information to use
when voting, so all dispersed information aggregates during the election. In contrast, a sequential election
may generate voter herding amongst uncommitted voters. As in the literature on observational social learning
(e.g. Banerjee 1992, Bikhchandani et al. 1992), voters in later periods may choose to ignore their private
signals in favor of following the lead of earlier voters. This herding results in a loss of information while
emphasizing the importance of early states’ results.
I address when and how the party can beneﬁt from voter herding–in spite of the loss of valuable information–
to maximize the probability of selecting the highest quality candidate. By choosing whether to have a sequen-
tial election and—if so—the actual sequence in which states vote, the party can control whether momentum
eﬀects will be present and guarantee that any herding will be ex ante beneﬁcial to the goal of selecting the
highest quality candidate.
My ﬁndings are as follows: ﬁrst, I show that a simultaneous election outperforms all sequential mechanisms
when both candidates are expected to have equal loyal support and voters across all states are ex ante
homogeneous. In this case, the political party does best by allowing all private information from uncommitted
voters to aggregate without momentum eﬀects.
In contrast, if one candidate has more expected loyal support than the other, a sequential election out-
performs simultaneous voting if there is an adequate combination of loyal voter imbalance and low quality
of private information. Moreover, the party necessarily beneﬁts from voter herding with even a very small
loyal voter imbalance when the population is suﬃciently large. This result contrasts that of Banerjee (1992),
who ﬁnds that herding “may be (and for a large enough population, will be) ineﬃcient in the ex ante welfare
sense.”5 In this paper, voter herding in a sequential election may be optimal when there is a loyal voter
imbalance, and will be optimal for a large enough population.
The main reason for the contrast with the herding literature is that voter herding in my model serves to
compensate for an imbalance in loyal support for the two candidates. By choosing a sequential election, the
party allows for social learning among uncommitted voters to take place across states. The herding in later
states can generate enough votes for the high quality candidate to overcome the imbalance of loyal voters.
Under the same conditions, simultaneous voting may not induce a strong enough result to overcome this
imbalance.
As in the simple herding literature, social learning entails the risk that voters may herd to the wrong
candidate. The party takes on this risk in a sequential election; the quality of information from early states
alone (compared to all states) provides a less accurate estimate of which candidate is best. If candidates have
equal expected loyal support, there is no initial imbalance which needs to be compensated for, and so the party
is best oﬀ not taking the risk of negative herding. Choosing the less risky primary system—a simultaneous
election—is therefore optimal in this case; all available information is thus utilized to obtain the most precise
estimate of which candidate is best.
I then analyze the optimal sequence of states given that a sequential election is preferred by the party.
States diﬀer in fraction of informed voters, fraction of loyal voters, and the degree to which voters within the
state diﬀer (voter diversity). It is by selectively increasing the eﬀective importance of results from early states
that the party can best beneﬁt from herd behavior. I show that, holding each of the other characteristics
constant, it is optimal for the states voting early in the primary season to be those which: (i) are smaller, (ii)
have fewer loyal voters, (iii) have more informed voters, and (iv) display more voter diversity.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a short history of primaries. Section 3 reviews the related
literature. The model is described in Section 4, and optimal voting behavior is characterized in Section 5.
5Welch (1992) and Bikhchandani et al (1992) arrive at similar results in variations of the simple herding model.
3Section 6 contains the main results regarding when a sequential election outperforms simultaneous voting.
The optimal voting sequence in a sequential election is analyzed in Section 7. Section 8 provides a discussion
regarding the temporal structure of primaries in recent elections, including some empirical observations of
patterns in calendar changes in the last three election cycles. Section 9 concludes. Proofs can be found in the
Appendix.
2 A brief history of primaries
Neither the U.S. Constitution nor federal law constrains the method by which political parties choose their
presidential nominees.6 Candidates were chosen by caucuses in Congress until the 1830s, when a system of
national party conventions developed to nominate candidates. These conventions were attended by delegates
chosen by state and local level party insiders. Candidates were chosen in the proverbial “smoke-ﬁlled back
rooms” by professional party politicians bargaining for delegates.
In 1901, Florida became the ﬁrst state to allow parties to choose their delegates with a primary election.
Four years later, a Wisconsin statute was the ﬁrst to require that parties do so. Oregon went one step further
in 1910, making it mandatory for elected delegates to vote for the actual candidate for whom primary voters
had expressed preference. Between 1920 and 1968, however, an average of only 15 states held primaries, and
only 40% of all delegates were chosen or bound by primary voters. While the nominating system in those
years was in principle a mix of inside strategies and popularity among voters, the system still relied very
heavily on inside politics rather than primaries.
The events surrounding the 1968 Democratic primary ultimately brought the end of the mixed system.
The anti-war candidate Eugene McCarthy won several early primaries while latecomer Robert Kennedy was
successful in later ones. After Kennedy was assassinated, however, party insiders succeeded in nominating
Hubert Humphrey, who had not competed in any primaries at all. While Humphrey went on to lose the general
election, McCarthy supporters felt their candidate had been wronged, blaming irregularities and secrecy in
the system. Riots outside the convention in Chicago reﬂected the feelings of such voters, and led to the
McGovern-Fraser Reforms, which explicitly rejected the notion that party insiders would run the nomination
process. The Republicans quickly followed suit, and winning primaries has been the key to winning both
parties’ nominations since 1972.
The current temporal structure of primaries has risen mainly through coincidence and state-level political
maneuvering. In 1916, New Hampshire chose its primary date to be on its town meeting day, scheduled for
March to avoid the ensuing “mud season” during which roads were closed and farmers could not travel into
town. It is for this reason that New Hampshire has its “ﬁrst-in-the-nation” presidential primary status. The
other famously early state, Iowa, had its caucus moved up in 1972 by an operative for George McGovern as
part of the McGovern-Fraser Reforms.
Other states have tried to increase their inﬂuence by holding earlier primaries. The current trend of
“front-loading”, where multiple states move their primaries earlier in the year, began in 1988 when a group
of southern states moved their dates to increase regional inﬂuence. New Hampshire and Iowa later responded
with laws requiring themselves to go ﬁrst. A political struggle over the primary calendar has followed, both
among states and between states and the national parties. As a result of this political maneuvering, there
has been signiﬁcant movement in states’ primary dates in recent elections. Please see Section 8 for a more
detailed discussion regarding recent changes in the primary calendar and how they relate to the theoretical
6See Part 1 of DiClerico & Davis (2000) and Chapter 1 of Bartels (1988) for more detailed summaries of the history of the
nomination process.
4results in this paper.
3 Related literature
The literature on observational social learning–which I will also refer to as the pure herding literature–
originated with Banerjee (1992), Welch (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992), the last of which includes
presidential primaries as an example to which their model applies.7 In these papers, agents with private
information and common values sequentially make a decision over a set of alternatives of uncertain value. All
decisions are made public so that agents may choose to ignore their private signals and vote based on the
observed actions of agents who decide before them.
There are several papers which analyze the temporal structure of elections. Dekel & Piccione (2000) show
that the temporal structure does not matter since voting equilibria of sequential elections are the same as
those of simultaneous elections. Morton & Williams (1999, 2001) examine herding with multiple candidates
and voters with varying risk aversion. Witt (1997) and Fey (2000) consider common-value environments in
which herding may occur in a sequential election. More recently, Callander (2007) considers a sequential
election in which voters get utility from both conforming and voting for the likely best candidate. Herding
results as the desire to conform dominates when the number of voters increases. Iaryczower (2008) considers
strategic voting in sequential committees.
A common thread among these papers is that they are positive models of sequential elections with strategic
voters. In this paper, I focus on the normative question of which system of primaries is optimal from the
party’s point of view. In doing so, I restrict attention to sincere voting to simplify the analysis. Even when
strategic considerations are present in this environment, sincere voting–for the candidate with the highest
posterior probability of being best–can be supported as an equilibrium. Ali & Kartik (2007) refer to this type
of voting as posterior-based. They consider an environment similar to this paper, in which voters are either
partisans or neutral. Neutral voters in early periods are aware that neutral voters in later periods may use
their vote as information, and vote strategically to maximize the probability the best candidate is elected.
Posterior-based voting is shown to be an equilibrium of the voting game.
To the best of my knowledge, Klumpp & Polborn (2006) provide the only mainly normative analysis
of the temporal structure of presidential primaries. In a key contrast to this paper, they focus exclusively
on candidates’ reactions to primary results by endogenizing campaigning behavior. They show that the
winning candidate from the ﬁrst period has more incentive to campaign harder in later periods than the
losing candidate, leading to a momentum eﬀect. State primary results are random variables which depend
on campaign expenditures in that state only. “Voters” are unaﬀected by all other factors, including other
states’ primary results. Klumpp & Polborn (2006) ﬁnd that a sequential system results in lower levels of
advertising expenditures than does a simultaneous election, and is also more likely to select the more eﬀective
campaigner.
4 The model
There is a primary election with two candidates (c = A,B) from the same political party. Nature determines
which candidate cHQ ∈ {A,B} is of highest quality, placing probability 1/2 on each. The election is contested
in a total of S ∈ N states. Each state s ∈ S = {1,...,S} holds an election which determines ds ∈ N delegates,
assumed to be proportional to the state’s population. Let vc
s be the number of votes cast for candidate c
7See Bikhchandani et al (1992) pg. 1010.
5in state s. Delegates are assigned by proportional representation.8 The number of delegates dA
s received by











The candidate receiving the majority of the
P
s∈S ds delegates wins the party’s nomination.
Voter preferences are as follows. First, voting is costless for all voters, so all voters vote in the primary
election. Each state contains three types of voters: (i) loyal voters of candidate A, (ii) loyal voters of candidate
B, and (iii) uncommitted voters. Loyal voters are characterized by a rigid preference for one candidate. A
loyal voter of candidate c gets utility one from voting for c and zero otherwise. Uncommitted voters get utility
one from voting for cHQ and zero otherwise. Because the true identity of cHQ is never observed, the relevant
object to analyze for uncommitted voters is their expected utility at the time they must vote.
4.1 Information structure
To deﬁne an uncommitted voter’s expected utility, I will ﬁrst introduce the information structure. An un-





= qs > 1/2.
Depending on the system of primaries ultimately chosen by the political party, elections in diﬀerent states
may be held on diﬀerent dates. Let τ(s) ∈ {1,...,T} denote the date on which state s votes. When an
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Uncommitted voters are Bayesian: the expected utility of an uncommitted voter voting for candidate c
on date t is the posterior probability (as of date t) that c = cHQ. This probability is conditional on private




c = cHQ | θi,s,qs,Hτ(s)
	
.
The uncommitted voter chooses c ∈ {A,B} to maximize Ui,s(c).
4.2 Composition of electorate
The composition of the electorate is determined stochastically. Voters observe only the distribution from
which this composition is drawn. This distribution is deﬁned as follows. Each voter in state s receives a
preference shock so that she is a loyal voter of candidate A with probability pA
s , a loyal voter of candidate B
with probability pB
s , and an uncommitted voter with probability 1 − pA
s − pB
s .
The stochastic nature of the electorate is intended to capture idiosyncrasies and various unpredictable
aspects of how voters will react to candidates in a primary election. However, it would be unreasonable
to assume that preferences and information are determined independently on an individual level. A more
reasonable assumption is that there are large blocs of voters–which I will call voter groups–whose voting
8An extension of the paper which compares proportional representation to a winner-take-all delegate system is in progress.
It is useful to note, however, that the assumption of proportional representation does not aﬀect voter herding in this model.
Because voters are sincere and have access to complete election results, they would react the same way to a given tally of votes
regardless of how that tally maps to a delegate count.
6behavior is determined by similar factors. Voters within one voter group are interpreted as those who have
similar political views, consume similar media (newspapers, television channels, internet sites, etc.) and have
similar reactions to those media, candidate advertising and other sources of political information.
Voter groups are modeled as follows. Each state s has ns equally sized voter groups. All voters within a
voter group receive identical preference and information shocks. Across voter groups within a state, both pref-
erence shocks and private signals are independently and identically distributed. Technically, this assumption
is equivalent to assuming a smaller number of voters in each state than there actually are. As a result, the
initial uncertainty regarding which is the highest quality candidate is preserved after observing early primary
results. If preference and information shocks were i.i.d. across individual voters, this uncertainty would be
eliminated by the Law of large Numbers.
The notion of voter groups achieves the purpose of capturing both idiosyncrasies and aggregate shocks
within a state population. In doing so, it also allows for an explicit representation of voter diversity within
each state. While voter groups are assumed to be the same size within a state, they may be diﬀerent sizes
across states. Because ds is proportional to the population of state s, the number of voter groups per delegate,
λs ≡ ns/ds, is used to denote the voter diversity in state s. Voter diversity λs captures how informative the
assignment of each delegate in state s is to future voters. The more independent draws ns are used to
determine the composition of a state’s electorate, the more informative results from that state will be.
4.3 Political party’s problem
The political party is faced with choosing an optimal temporal structure for its primaries. Because this
structure cannot be speciﬁc to candidates in a particular election cycle, I assume that the party does not
know the true identity of cHQ. Instead, it has the same (uniform) prior for cHQ as uncommitted voters.
Additionally, in the absence of candidate identities, the party also cannot observe the exact number of loyal
voters and uncommitted voters in the electorate. The party observes only the distribution, described above,
from which this composition is drawn.
I can now formalize the political party’s problem. An ordered partition O of the set of states S is given
by
O = S1,...,ST,




Let O(S) be the set of ordered partitions of S. Then, each ordered partition O ∈ O(S) represents one of the
possible temporal structures for primaries which the party can choose, where
St = {s ∈ S : τ (s) = t}
denotes the set of states whose elections are held on date t. Let W(O) denote the realized winner of an election















Loyal voter voting behavior is ﬁxed. All loyal voters always vote for their own candidate regardless of the
temporal structure of primaries or when in the sequence they vote. The rest of this section analyzes the voting
behavior of uncommitted voters.
Uncommitted voters in the ﬁrst period have only private information on which to base their vote, since
H1 = ∅. They hence all vote in accordance with private signal θi,s. To characterize optimal voting behavior
for uncommitted voters in periods t ≥ 2, I introduce the following notation. Let γc
s represent the probability
that a randomly selected voter in state s, with τ (s) = 1, votes for c given that c = cHQ. This probability is
simply the sum of the probability that the voter is a loyal voter of candidate c plus the probability that the










Because the election in state s is simply the result of ns independent draws of such a voter, the number













If state s = 1 is the only one to vote in the ﬁrst period, an uncommitted voter in state s = 2 voting in the










































































are the appropriate binomial density functions. Solving (1) yields the following result:







the optimal voting decision for a second period uncommitted voter in state s0 with private signal θi,s0 and signal
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are the appropriate binomial density functions. If n1 voter groups all characterized by (pA
1 ,pB
1 ,q1) vote in the
ﬁrst period, with vA
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The intuition behind lemma 1 is straightforward. When candidate A receives more than ΩA(n1) votes in
period 1, even uncommitted voters who receive a private signal of θi,s0 = B in period 2 believe with probability
greater than 1/2 that cHQ = A. The indiﬀerence curve for such voters is ΩA(n1). Symmetrically, ΩB(n1) is
the indiﬀerence curve for those uncommitted voters who receive a signal of θi,s0 = A. For all results such that
candidate A receives fewer than ΩB(n1) votes, all uncommitted voters believe with probability greater than
1/2 that cHQ = B.
Figures 1-4 provide graphs of ΩA(n1) and ΩB(n1) under diﬀerent conditions on the parameters pA
1 ,pB
1
and q2. There are two key features to this sensitivity analysis. First, when pA
1 > pB
1 , candidate A must
receive more ﬁrst period votes to induce second periods voters to herd to him than does candidate B. This
is because second period voters know that candidate A is expected to have more loyal support and attribute
a portion of his vote total to this fact. Second, when second period voters have a higher signal quality qs0,
they are less likely to herd at all. The decision to herd rather than vote with one’s private information can
be interpreted as trusting public information (in this case, the results of the ﬁrst state’s primary) more than
one’s private information. When the quality of second period voters’ private information increases, so too
does the threshold of how many ﬁrst period votes a candidate must receive in order to convince uncommitted
voters receiving the opposite signal to vote for him.
Lemma 1 characterizes herding in the second period only. Herding behavior in future periods is addressed
by the next result.
Let nt denote the number of votes cast in period t, and let vA
t be the number of them cast for candidate
A.
Lemma 2 Suppose qs ≥ qs0 for all s,s0 such that τ (s) < τ (s0), and let qtmax ≡ max{qs : τ (s) = t}. Let
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denote the ﬁrst period in which all uncommitted voters herd to one candidate. Then, uncommitted voters in


































































11Lemma 2 simply states that once herding occurs, all future uncommitted voters will join the herd if they
do not have better private information than those who voted before them. Once herding begins, results from
all periods with full herding are ignored by future voters because they know that no private information is
being used in those periods. All uncertainty in such periods stems from the number of loyal voters (of the
candidate not beneﬁting from herding), which contains no useful information to uncommitted voters.
6 Sequential vs. simultaneous election
To analyze whether a simultaneous or sequential election is optimal, I will consider the case with homogeneous










for all s, allowing states to still
vary in their number of delegates ds. This simpliﬁcation is made for tractability of the model and to allow for
clearer results. It is important to note, however, that nothing in my preliminary analysis of the heterogeneous
model indicated that the basic results do not carry through.
The deﬁnition of a simultaneous election is staightforward; it is an election in which all states hold their
primary on the same date, so that no voter can observe any results from any other states. In this paper, I
use the term sequential to describe all elections which are not simultaneous. The purpose of this section is to
identify when a simultaneous election outperforms all sequential elections. In the seminal herding literature
(e.g. Banerjee 1992, Bikhchandani et al. 1992), observational social learning typically results in undesirable
information cascades. Agents who could rely on private information instead choose to follow a herd. The
resulting equilibrium is ex ante ineﬃcient due to the risk that voters herd to the wrong candidate. In contrast,
simultaneous voting does not allow for such an information cascade and therefore does not lead to this kind
of ineﬃcient result.
I ﬁnd that sequential elections can outperform simultaneous voting under a wide range of conditions. This
result is in contrast with the prevailing notion that herding is ineﬃcient. The main reason for this contrast
is that voter herding in my model can serve to compensate for an imbalance in loyal support for the two
candidates. In fact, one necessary condition for a sequential election to be optimal is for candidates to have
diﬀerent numbers of expected loyal voters
 
pA 6= pB
. Throughout this section, let N ≡
P
s∈S ns denote the
total number of voter groups. Also, in a slight abuse of notation, let nt ≡
P
s:τ(s)=t ns denote the number of
voter groups voting on date t.
6.1 The case with equal loyal support
When both candidates are expected to have equal loyal support, I ﬁnd that a simultaneous election outperforms
all sequential elections. In fact, I prove an even stronger result. When calculating the probability of electing
cHQ under a sequential election, the political party must integrate out all possible results from early periods.
Theorem 1 states that even if the party were given the option of ﬁrst observing the ﬁrst period voting result and
then deciding whether or not to “reveal” the result to future voters, it would not reveal the result regardless of












for all s, and that pA = pB. Let N ≡
P
s∈S ns. For any





of number of votes n1 of which vA
1 are cast
for candidate A, the probability of selecting the highest quality candidate is at least as high when (n1,vA
1 ) is





does not secure the nomination for either candidate but does induce herding in the second period, revealing
12the tally results in a strictly lower probability of selecting the higher quality candidate than not revealing. For
all other parameter values, revealing the tally has no eﬀect.
Together with lemma 2, theorem 1 results in an immediate corollary.
Corollary 1 When voters across states are ex ante homogeneous and pA = pB, a simultaneous election
outperforms any sequential election.
The result that preventing voter herding from occurring is optimal is similar to the ﬁndings in the herding
literature that herding is ineﬃcient in an ex ante social welfare sense. Indeed, the uncommitted voters in this
model behave in much the same way as agents in that literature. When loyal voters are expected to cancel
each other out in number, the election is eﬀectively decided by these uncommitted voters. In such a case, the
probability of selecting the highest quality candidate coincides with the probability of correctly identifying
that candidate through information revelation from uncommitted voters. This probability decreases when
private information is lost by way of voter herding. As in the herding literature, utilizing all available private
information is hence optimal.
6.2 The case with an imbalance of loyal voters
It turns out, however, that the optimality of simultaneous voting does not hold in many cases when there
is a loyal voter imbalance. When one candidate–say candidate A–has more loyal support, then a sequential
election is optimal if there is an adequate combination of suﬃcient loyal voter imbalance and low quality of
private information. The intuition for this fact can be summarized as one candidate’s quality overcoming
another candidate’s advantage in loyal support when there is voter herding.
A numerical example may help illustrate the phenomenon. Abstracting from the stochastic composition
of the electorate, suppose pA = 1/4 and pB = 0, so uncommitted voters make up 3/4 of the electorate. For
candidate B to win the election, he needs to receive at least 2/3 of the uncommitted votes. If q < 2/3, however,
fewer than 2/3 of the uncommitted voters vote for B in a simultaneous election even if he is the high quality
candidate. As a result, candidate A will win the nomination simply because he has more loyal voters. This is
where a sequential election can help the party get the best candidate selected. A sequential election induces
voter herding which serves to correlate uncommitted voters to all vote for the highest quality candidate in
later voting periods. Rather than only a fraction q < 2/3 voting for the best candidate, voters herding to the
best candidate can ensure the best candidate receives more than the necessary 2/3 of uncommitted votes to
win the nomination.
While a sequential election involves the risk that later voters will herd to the wrong candidate, this risk
is worth taking for the party in cases such as the above example when a simultaneous election is likely to
simply select the candidate with more loyal voters. This result is a novel example of a beneﬁcial information
cascade, in contrast with the socially ineﬃcient cascades in the standard herding literature. Theorem 2 helps
to formalize the result, stating that when pA > pB, a suﬃciently large number of total voter groups and a











for all s, and that pA > pB.Then:
1. For any q > 1/2, there exists N∗(q) > 0 such that a sequential election outperforms simultaneous voting
iﬀ N > N∗(q).









(1−pA−pB)(pA−pB) , there exists q∗(N) > 1/2 such that a sequential election outper-
forms simultaneous voting iﬀ q < q∗ (N).
13It should be noted that as the loyal voter imbalance pA−pB increases, N∗(q) decreases for all q and q∗(N)
increases for all N. That is, the greater the loyal voter imbalance, the larger the set of other parameters for
which a sequential election is optimal. The reason low levels of q result in a sequential election being optimal
is illustrated in the numerical example above. If q > 2/3 in the example, then the party would not need to
take the risk of voters herding to the wrong candidate in order to get cHQ nominated. The reason a large
number of total voter groups leads to an optimal sequential election is as follows. Because a certain number
of independent draws is needed to provide a decent estimate of which candidate is cHQ, an election with a
small total number N of voter groups would not have enough voters left over to beneﬁt from the early voters
and make a diﬀerence in the result by herding. At the opposite extreme, as the number of voter groups grows
arbitrarily large, the probability of the ﬁrst period estimate being correct approaches one, while an arbitrarily
large number of voters are still left over to herd to cHQ and ensure he gets nominated.
As discussed in Section 1, the result that voter herding can be optimal contrasts the simple herding
literature’s result that herding is ineﬃcient in an ex ante welfare sense. The main reason is the loyal voter
imbalance for which herding acts as compensation. A second reason is that the political party is concerned
only with which candidate wins the nomination, and not the margin of victory or defeat. While a sequential
election increases the probability of a lopsided victory by the wrong candidate, it can (at the same time) still
decrease the probability that the wrong candidate wins at all. The measure of ex ante welfare in Banerjee
(1992) is simply the expected fraction of people who make the correct choice, so a lopsided defeat of the high
quality candidate would correspond to a lower welfare level than would a close defeat. In this paper, a defeat
by any margin of the high quality candidate yields no return for the party. In an ex ante sense, the simple
probability of selecting the high quality candidate is the signiﬁcant measure of success.
To more precisely characterize when a sequential election is best, consider a two-period party problem
with homogeneous voters. Abstracting from exact state sizes, let n1 ∈ [1,N] be the party’s choice variable
of how many voter groups will vote in period 1, with n2 = N − n1 voters in period 2. Let V (n1) denote
the party’s objective function: the probability of electing cHQ when n1 votes are cast in period 1. Lemma 3
states that to see if any sequential election exists that outperforms simultaneous voting, it is enough to check
if the sequential election with the highest number of possible voters in the ﬁrst period (while still allowing











for all s, and that pA > pB. Let n1 ≤ N denote that which
satisﬁes
ΩB(n1) = n1 −
N
2
if one exists and n1 = N −1 if one does not. (Then n1 is the maximum number of ﬁrst period voters such that
future herding can aﬀect the election result.) There exists a sequential election which outperforms simultaneous
voting iﬀ V (Floor(n1)) > V (N).
Figure 5 shows the case with n1 = N −1. Note that n1 = N −1 holds whenever pA = pB. Figure 6 shows
the case in which n1 < N − 1. Lemma 3 makes it signiﬁcantly easier to analytically determine the parameter
values for which a sequential election is optimal. If n1 voters have voted in period 1 and the result is potential
relevant herding (meaning that neither candidate has secured the nomination when herding begins), then
the trailing candidate (necessarily the one with fewer loyal voters, candidate B) must receive all remaining
votes to win the nomination. Conditional on this ﬁrst period result, if the probability that cHQ = B is not
suﬃciently high that the party prefers herding to occur, Lemma 3 states that the party cannot want herding
















herding to candidate B

















herding to candidate B




Given that the party uses a sequential election, it must also determine what actual sequence of states is best.
In this section, I allow states voting in diﬀerent periods to have diﬀerent characteristics. Suppose for simplicity
that there are two states (s,s0) which are to vote in sequential periods. Theorem 3 provides results regarding
which state should vote ﬁrst when the states diﬀer along one dimension at a time.












,qs = qs0 and ds > ds0. If ns = ns0, then it is optimal for
state s0 to vote ﬁrst. If λs = λs0, then the optimal sequence depends on the exact parameters.
















, then it is optimal












, then the optimal sequence depends on the exact
parameters.9












,λs = λs0 and qs > qs0, then it is optimal for state s to vote ﬁrst.












,qs = qs0 and λs > λs0, then it is optimal for state s to vote ﬁrst.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. When having fewer voters vote in ﬁrst period, the party
is accepting the following trade-oﬀ: there is a lower probability that cHQ will be correctly identiﬁed by ﬁrst
period voting results, but more second period voters who will herd, and hence a higher probability of pivotal
herding. As long as states carry the same level of informativeness, it is better if they are smaller so that more
voters remain for the second period. Fewer loyal voters and more informed voters both make an early state’s
results more informative to future states. Hence both are optimal. Higher voter diversity makes a state’s
results more informative as well, and hence is optimal in early states.
8 Discussion
As mentioned in Section 2, the primary calendar has seen signiﬁcant changes in recent elections. These
changes pose the following questions: Is there a systematic pattern when comparing early states to late states?
What demographic characteristics are correlated with states’ primary dates?
To begin answering these questions, one can choose from a wide range of state level data. In this section I
present some data on state-level characteristics that I conjecture are correlated with the theoretical parameters
of my model. The goal of this section is not to rationalize recent movements in primary dates, nor even to
claim any causal connection between the movements and the state characteristics presented. Indeed, there is
very little reason to believe that such a causal relationship exists. As mentioned in Sections 1 and 2, political
maneuvering and coincidences independent of any notion of optimality have been responsible for most of the
changes. However, one can still observe, on a casual level, whether changes in the recent election cycles have
been going toward the optimal sequence found in Section 7 or away from such a sequence. Recall that in a
sequential election, it is optimal for the states voting early in the primary season to be those which have fewer
loyal voters, have more informed voters and display more voter diversity.
Table 1 contains some observed patterns from the last three election cycles. For each election (2000,
2004, 2008), states are divided into two groups based on when the Democratic primary was held.10 States













, it is optimal for state s0 to vote ﬁrst for all but a very small subset of the parameter space.
10In most states, the Democratic and Republican primaries are held on the same day. For this table, using the date of the
Republican primary results in nearly identical ﬁgures.
16as late.11 Three state level characteristics are shown. The ﬁrst, “diversity”, comes from the Sullivan index,
a measure of population diversity, consisting of variables regarding education, income, occupation, housing
ownership, ethnicity and religion. “BA education” is a measure of the fraction of voters in a state with at
least a bachelor’s degree, while “union” gives union members as a fraction of total workers.
2000 2004 2008
early late early late early late
#2008 delegates 1700 2428 2435 1693 2422 1706
diversity .472 .424 *** .454 .424 * .444 .436
(.056) (.055) (.059) (.056) (.065) (.052)
BA education .290 .256 ** .283 .247 ** .269 .266
(.043) (.055) (.055) (.046) (.046) (.063)
union .145 .113 * .134 .111 .122 .126
(.055) (.055) (.057) (.054) (.059) (.055)
p ≤ 0.01 :*** p ≤ 0.05 :** p ≤ 0.10 :*
Table 112
As can be seen in Table 1, early states displayed signiﬁcantly more diversity than late states in 2000
according to the Sullivan index. The shifting of the primary calendar reduced this signiﬁcance in 2004, and
eliminated any statistical signiﬁcance in 2008. Under the conjecture that this notion of diversity correlates
with voter diversity (λs) in my model, the sequence of states in 2000 matches most closely with the result that
more diverse states optimally vote ﬁrst. Relative to 2000, the 2004 sequence moved away from optimality,
while the 2008 calendar moved still further.
A similar decrease in signiﬁcance from 2000 to 2008 can be seen with the fraction of voters with a bachelor’s
degree. There are many studies that positively link political knowledge with education level.13 Assuming such
a relationship, the fraction of voters with a bachelor’s degree would likely correlate with the quality of private
information (qs) in my model. Recall that states with better private information quality optimally vote ﬁrst.
As was the case with diversity, the 2000 and 2004 primary calendars come closer to matching such an optimal
sequencing than the 2008 version, in which early and late states had virtually the same average fraction of
voters with a bachelor’s degree.
Finally, the fraction of union members is observed to be higher in early states than late states in 2000,
with the diﬀerence becoming insigniﬁcant in 2004 and especially 2008. Union membership is one of many
variables one can conjecture correlates with the probability of being a loyal voter as deﬁned by my model. It
is undoubtedly more diﬃcult to identify potential loyal voters in a primary election than in a general election.
In trying to do so, I attempt to choose voters who are more likely than others to choose a preferred candidate
based on a few particular issues for which it is easy to get information. Such voters are less likely to be
aﬀected by other states’ primary results since these results presumably contain little information regarding
the issues important to them. If one assumes union members ﬁt into this class of voters who form a rigid
preference for a particular candidate, the 2000 primary calendar display a suboptimal pattern of more loyal
voters in early states. The trend along this dimension, unlike the others, is toward a more optimal system
since the signiﬁcance of union membership disappears in 2004 and 2008.
11The dates of the last three “Super Tuesdays” were 7 March 2000, 2 March 2004 and 5 February 2008.
12Sources: Morgan & Wilson (1990) (diversity), 2006 American Community Survey (BA education), 2006 Current Population
Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics (union).
13Campbell et al. (1960) pg. 476 is one example.
179 Conclusion
The American presidential nomination process consists of a series of elections (primaries) in which states vote
at diﬀerent times. This paper has focused on the problem faced by a political party that wants to choose the
optimal temporal structure for its primaries. Considering an environment in which a sequential election may
generate voter herding, I have addressed both when and how the party can beneﬁt from social learning to
maximize the probability of selecting the highest quality candidate. By choosing whether to have a sequential
election and—if so—the actual sequence in which states vote, the party can control whether momentum eﬀects
will be present and guarantee that any voter herding will be ex ante beneﬁcial to the goal of selecting the
highest quality candidate.
When candidates are expected to have equal loyal support, simultaneous voting outperforms all sequential
elections. In a simultaneous election, uncommitted voters cannot rely on any information save their own
private signals. Therefore, they vote based on these private signals and the maximum possible amount of
information is aggregated in determining the party’s nominee. This result is similar to the ﬁndings in the
standard herding literature (e.g. Banerjee 1992, Bikhchandani et al. 1992) that herding is ineﬃcient in an ex
ante social welfare sense.
When one candidate has more loyal support, however, a sequential election can outperform simultaneous
voting. Under this condition, voter herding acts as compensation for the loyal voter imbalance. While a
simultaneous election may not result in enough votes for the highest quality candidate to overcome an initial
loyal voter deﬁcit, a sequential election induces voter herding which serves to correlate uncommitted voters
to all vote for the highest quality candidate in later voting periods. While such herding involves the risk that
voters will herd to the wrong candidate, it can still increase the probability that the high quality candidate
is selected relative to when voting is simultaneous. This result is a novel example of a beneﬁcial information
cascade, in contrast with the socially ineﬃcient cascades in the standard herding literature.
The results in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 indicating whether a sequential or simultaneous election is optimal
have implications for the welfare eﬀects of political polls as well. Until now, most of the normative literature
on political polls has focused on how polls aﬀect turnout. Using the costly voting framework found in Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1983), Klor and Winter (2007) show that polls have a positive eﬀect on total welfare when
one candidate is expected to have more initial total support. Goeree and Großer (2007) show that polls can
reduce welfare by stimulating the minority group to turn out in high enough numbers relative to the majority
when an election is close. These papers and others focus on the turnout decision made by voters who already
know which candidate they prefer.
This paper provides a groundwork for a normative analysis of political polls which focuses not on turnout
but rather the actual voting decision made by voters. The release of poll data can be assumed to aﬀect
uncommitted voters in a fashion similar to early primary results. Because uncommitted voters who participate
in pre-election polls can choose to use the poll results to change their vote, the trade-oﬀ concerning the number
of “remaining” voters after the ﬁrst period is no longer relevant. This fact should only simplify the analysis.
Moreover, it is safe to conjecture that the analysis regarding information aggregation will be quite similar to
that of this paper.
1810 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. An uncommitted voter in the second period receiving a private signal of θi,2 = A with










































































































































































































and will vote for candidate B otherwise. Symmetrically, an uncommitted voter receiving a signal of θi,2 = B




















































and will vote for B otherwise. It follows that the optimal voting decision for a second period uncommitted
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A for vA
1 > ΩA(n1)




Proof of Lemma 2. The ﬁrst period in which all uncommitted voters herd to one candidate can be denoted
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will herd to candidate A, as shown in lemma 1. Given the assumption qs ≥ qs0 for all s,s0 such that
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so that if uncommitted voters in period b t herd to candidate c, then voters in period t would have also herded
to candidate c had they voted in period b t. Uncommitted voters in period b t+1 observe all results from periods
1,...,b t−1 and therefore know that no uncommitted voters in period b t voted based on their private information.
Therefore, their optimal voting behavior is to vote based only on results from the ﬁrst b t − 1 states, which
given the assumption qs ≥ qs0 for all s,s0 such that τ (s) < τ (s0) is to herd to the same candidate that voters
in period b t herded to. Voters in period b t + 2 will then also know that private information was only revealed
in periods 1,...,b t − 1 and therefore also herd to the same candidate, and so on for all periods t > b t.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let p ≡ pA = pB. Also let V2(n1,vA
1 ) be the probability of electing the better
candidate when (n1,vA
1 ) is revealed to the remaining N − n1 voters, and let V1(n1,vA
1 ) be the probability of
electing the better candidate when (n1,vA
1 ) is not revealed. (The subscript refers to the number of eﬀective
periods of voting, since not revealing the tally is equivalent to simultaneous voting.) When (i) or (ii) are not
satisﬁed, it is immediate that V1(n1,vA
1 ) = V2(n1,vA
1 ), since the failure of (i) means the second period voter will
vote according to their signals regardless of learning the tally, and the failure of (ii) means that the winner of
the election has already been determined by the current tally. We are left to show that V1(n1,vA
1 ) > V2(n1,vA
1 )
for any (q,N,p,n1,vA
1 ) such that (i) and (ii) hold. Let Wk denote the winner of the election when there are k
eﬀective periods of voting, so that Vk(n1,vA
1 ) = Pr

Wk = cHQ	
. Due to the problem being symmetric when
20pA = pB, we can restrict attention to the case in which ΩA(n1) < vA
1 < N/2. In this case, we have that
Vk(n1,vA
1 ) = Pr























































































































Because pA = pB implies γA = γB, let γ ≡ γA = γB = p + (1 − 2p)q. Let f (·;m,ρ) and F (·;m,ρ)
denote the binomial probability density function and binomial cumulative distribution functions, respec-
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1 ;N − n1,1 − p

> 0. (6)
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> 0 for all q > 1/2.





















< 1 and 2vA
1 − n1 > 0 is implied by vA
1 > ΩA(n1) when pA = pB. The fourth term
is positive since p ∈ (0,1) is assumed. Because each summand is positive, it is immediate that the sum is
positive and hence Φ(q) > 0 for all q > 1/2, which proves the result.
Proof of Corollary 1. The party’s objective function for a simultaneous election can be rewritten as a
weighted average of the probability–assuming all uncommitted voters vote according to their private signals in
all periods–of selecting cHQ conditional on each ﬁrst period result, with each result weighted by its probability
of occurrence. Similarly, the party’s objective function for a sequential election can be rewritten as a weighted
average of the probability–assuming uncommitted voters in future periods herd if it is optimal for them to
do so–of selecting cHQ conditional on each ﬁrst period result, with each result weighted by its probability of
occurrence. From Theorem 1, we have that the party is at least as well oﬀ not revealing results from the ﬁrst
period to future voters regardless of what that outcome is. This means that the probability of selecting cHQ
conditional on any possible ﬁrst period result is at least as high for a simultaneous election as a sequential one.
Given that each component of the weighted averages described above is at least as high for a simultaneous
election, it follows immediately that the weighted average itself is at least as high for a simultaneous election.
The weighted average is sure to be strictly higher for a simultaneous election from the result in Theorem 1





does not secure the nomination for either candidate
but does induce herding in the second period, revealing the tally results in a strictly lower probability of
selecting the higher quality candidate than not revealing.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof of (1) is in two steps. I will show that: (i) it is optimal for the party
for the very last voter–assuming she is uncommitted–to herd (necessarily to candidate B, the candidate with
fewer loyal voters) rather than use her own private information when she is the only voter not voting in
the ﬁrst period and she is pivotal in determining the election result, and (ii) that conditions (1) and (2) are
suﬃcient to induce the situation described in part (i). To show (i), assume that each candidate has received
N−1
2 votes after the ﬁrst N − 1 voters have voted. Call this event T. The probability that the cHQ will be
selected in a simultaneous election is equal to q, the probability that the last voter receives the correct signal.
In a sequential election, the probability that cHQ will be selected is equal to
Pr
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, since γA > 1/2 and γB > 1/2. It follows
that  
γA 































cHQ = B | T
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which proves (i). To prove (ii), note that from lemma 2 we have that an uncommitted voter observing event
T will herd to candidate B regardless of her private signal if and only if
 
γB 









which is true when pA > pB as shown in (12). We can rewrite (13) as
γB  
1 − γB








24Note that RHS (14) & 1 as N → ∞ and that LHS (14) > 1 for all pA > pB. Therefore, there exists an N
large enough such that (14) holds. Call the value at which (14) holds with equality N∗ (q), and (1) follows.
To show (2), note that
γB  
1 − γB
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q
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1 − pB − (1 − pA − pB)q

[pA + (1 − pA − pB)q][1 − pA − (1 − pA − pB)q]
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The relevant factor as to how large N has to be for (14) to occur for an arbitrarily small value of q is how the
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